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THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
SIX YEARS OF INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT
Zaure Ayupova*
The independent existence of Kazakhstan began on October 25,
1990, with the acceptance of Article 6 of the Declaration of State Sover-
eignty, which established that "the state authority in the Kazakh SSR has
leadership, independence, and completeness within the Union Republic."'
On December 16, 1991, in addition to the sovereignty declaration, a new
law establishing the state independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan
was approved.2
After achieving independence, Kazakhstan faced problems regarding
the formation, strengthening, and perfection of its statehood. The disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, in contrast to other regions of the planet,
"has resulted not necessarily in the formation of essentially new states,
but in the revival of lost statehood from former times for lands with deep
historical roots."3
A sovereign republic must decide many urgent and vital problems
such as: (1) transition from one economic system to another, (2) devel-
opments in the process of democratization, (3) preservation and strength-
ening of social and interethnic stability, (4) determination of foreign pol-
icy; (5) preservation of territorial integrity, (6) problems of conformity in
legislation to accepted models of development, and (7) development of
integrated processes in the context of international cooperative frame-
works, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter
CIS).
The peaceful achievement of independent statehood was a distinctive
feature of Kazakhstan's particular variant of sovereignty. This peaceful-
ness allowed state-building to begin upon the old management system.
Through gradual reforms the old system underwent a slow and painless
transformation to a modern state.
Professor, University of Kazakstan, Fulbright Scholar, University of Kentucky, 1997-98.
1. Source on file with the author.
2. Source on file with the author.
3. See N.A. NAZARBAEV, ON THE THRESHOLD OFTHE XXI CENTURY 138 (1996).
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At the first stage in the construction of statehood, at the end of 1991,
significant reforms in economic relations were sought. Laws concerning
private property and enterprise were enacted, opening the way to further
reforms and privatization initiatives. New social institutions, reflective of
and appropriate to new requirements of a varied and changing society,
have begun to flourish.
The year of 1992 began the next stage in Kazakhstan's forming
statehood. This included: the creation of the armed forces of the new re-
public; the creation and formal acceptance of new state symbols; and
further transformations in the economy, such as liberalization of prices
and the increasing commercialization of the separate spheres of manu-
facturing. It was also a year of external policy triumphs for Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan became a member of the world community of independent
nations and was admitted to the United Nations on March 2, 1992. Ka-
zakhstan was also admitted to the Untied Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization [hereinafter UNESCO] on May 22, 1992, and
on July 10, 1992 signed the final act of the SBSE.4 With the establish-
ment of a national agency for foreign investment, the work began in ear-
nest to attract world-wide interest in Kazakhstan's financial development.
A key direction in Kazakhstan's internal policy, which reflects a
collective concern for maintaining the strength of its own statehood, is
the national discussion of the first Constitution. The first Constitution
reflects new economic and political realities. The strategic purposes and
basic principles of the document are formulated in President Nursultan
Nazarbaev's writings which provide an important conceptual reference
on state and national identity in Kazakhstan's multiethnic setting.5
The work on the Constitution of Kazakhstan emphasized statehood
while encompassing the complex conditions and political disagreements
left in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise, as well as social and psy-
chological problems of adaptation in the face of new conditions. The
conditions for Kazakhstan's society during this period (characterized by
sharp decline of economic conditions aggravated by inflation, rampant
non-payments of debts, increasing unemployment, reduced production,
deteriorating quality of life) reflected the irony of personal-mprovement
gained by citizenship in a sovereign state. Coupled with the economic
downturn was an upsurge of movements based on national and ethnic
identities, whose vocal opinions surrounded the constitutional debate.
Chief among these opinions were concerns of the ethnic Russians in Ka-
zakhstan and in the neighboring Russian Federation regarding language
and citizenship in the new nation. Mass media campaigns on behalf of
4. Source on file with author.
5. See generally, PRESIDENT NURSULTAN NAZARBAEV, STRATEGY AND FORMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN AS A SOVEREIGN STATE (source on file with the author).
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Kazakhstan's Russians served to cast doubt on the Russian Federation's
respect for its new CIS partners.
The new Constitution, accepted January 23, 1993, by a Soviet era
government, had a dual character. On one hand, it promoted further
democratic transformations in the society and economy. On the other
hand, it caused disputes and instability. The Constitution failed to regu-
late and define the power of the legislative and executive branches. It was
necessary to resolve the problems inherited from the old totalitarian sys-
tem. These problems slowed the creation of conditions necessary for the
functioning of a new and improved system. First, the parliament or Su-
preme Kenges ("supreme body") still embodied the bulky decision-
making mechanisms of its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh
SSR, and lacked any real mechanism for the execution of legislative ini-
tiatives. Second, the exaggerated perpetuation of the ruble zone stymied
the formation of independent Kazakhstan's banking system.
The Supreme Kenges subsequently tried to undertake the functions
of distribution, shifting the responsibility for reform onto the shoulders of
the executive authority. For example, the Supreme Kenges accepted
populist political decisions on wage increases and social programs and
passed them along to the executive branch for fulfillment, despite the ob-
vious lack of available funds for such initiatives. This process perpetuated
the contradictions typical of the Soviet system and slowed progress con-
siderably. This stalemate resulted in the self-dissolution of the 12th Con-
vocation's Supreme Kenges.
Kazakhstan's first Constitution is both a product of Nazarbaev and a
testament to him. It creates what the document itself calls "a strong presi-
dential democracy. 6 According to the Constitution, the President had the
power to appoint: the prime minister and the deputies; the ministers of
foreign affairs, defense, and finance; the chief of state security, the secu-
rity council; the constitutional court and other judges; and the prosecutor
general. In late October 1994, Nazarbaev issued a decree that expanded
presidential powers to include the right to make decisions of strategic
socioeconomic importance. In the absence of a parliament (as was the
case from December, 1993 to March, 1994, and again after March, 1995)
the President ruled by direct decree. Even with the powers that the Con-
stitution invests in its President, the Republic of Kazakhstan is defined as
"a democratic, secular, and unitarian state" arising as a "form of state-
hood self-determined by the Kazakh nation."7 Unlike the constitutions of
the other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan's basic law makes no refer-
ence to any special status or role for Islam, but it does specify that the
state language is Kazakh. The Russian language 'is given a somewhat
6. See MARTHA BRILL OLcOTr, THE KAZAKHS 276 (2d ed. 1995).
7. Id.
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mysterious status of "language for interethnic communication" 8
Kazakhstan's withdrawal from the ruble zone resulted in the No-
vember, 1993 establishment of a national currency, the "tenge," which
signaled a break with the old Soviet economic community. The inde-
pendence of Kazakhstan is now also based on a separate financial credit
system, and thus began the real management of economic and financial
processes and reforms in the steadily more established republic.
A new Supreme Kenges, elected in March, 1994, comprised more
professionals and seemed headed on a more productive track. Yet it too,
became bogged down in disputes over the imperfection of the Code of
Kazakhstan and eventually the Constitutional Court declared this parlia-
ment non-legitimate. The Constitution of 1993 was essentially a collec-
tion of declarations devoid of real instructions, and did not allow for a
system of checks and balances. Moreover, it did not allow for the transi-
tion to a more democratic legal structure. In fact, the Constitution exacer-
bated problems in the market economy and in interethnic relations, par-
ticularly with its declaration of Kazakh as the sole official language; ef-
fectively denying the (then) majority population of ethnic Russians a "le-
gal" voice.
Early 1995 saw the Republic of Kazakhstan in the midst of a consti-
tutional crisis. The reopening of a civil suit brought by the Central Elec-
toral Commission's representative, Tatiana Kviatkovskaya, resulted in the
parliament's dissolution in March. This dissolution was followed in April
by a referendum on the expansion of presidential powers and the exten-
sion of his term until the year 2000. These events were preceded by ef-
forts in Kazakhstan to work with international experts on the develop-
ment of a constitution which would displace both the Kazakh SSR docu-
ment of 1978, as well as the flawed 1993 Constitution of the free state.
Among those consulted were Bamabas Johnson. Johnson implemented a
model project for former Soviet states which resulted in a group dedi-
cated to the creation of a new constitution for Kazakhstan. Included in
this company was: Nyrbulat Masanov (historian and president of the In-
ternational Fund for Maintenance and Support of Democratic Reforms in
Central Asia); Evgenii Zhovtis (executive of the Kazakhstan-American
Bureau for Human Rights and Justice); Valentina Sevryakova (president
of the independent trade union "Birlesu"); Barnabas Johnson (constitu-
tional expert); and Laurie Whyamen (lawyer and specialist on courts
systems). As this group seemed headed toward a successful drafting of a
new constitution, their momentum was stalled in July, 1995, by President
Nazarbaev's proposal to bring it to an immediate referendum. At the
same time Nazarbaev sought to extend existing laws and political struc-




dia scrutiny and criticism. Nazarbaev was scrutinized for his unilateral
actions.
The prevention of this type of situation was addressed in the work of
the group working on the new constitution. They sought limitations of
powers in the presidential structures and in parliamentary functions, as
well as in the role of the prosecutor's office. At the same time, they ad-
dressed issues of private property and interetinic relations. The document
was translated into the Kazakh language, but was refused publication by
either the official or so-called independent press, and came under criti-
cism from the Constitutional Court and the major democratic political
parties and public organizations. After a series of discussions and emen-
dations, the document was officially presented and adopted on August 30,
1995, as the new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This same
referendum prolonged the term of the President with a 95.46% vote in
favor of the measure, with more than 90% of the eligible populace re-
ported as voting.
The Constitution of Kazakhstan legally established a strong presi-
dential republic with distribution of powers among three branches of
authority. "Thus, in this country, a steady and successive institution of
strong state authority has been created that allows for the stability of all
internal political processes .... "9
The Constitution of 1995 states that "the Republic of Kazakhstan ap-
proves itself by the democratic, secular, legal and social state, higher val-
ues of which are the person, his life, rights, and freedom."' The new Ba-
sic Law of the independent state predetermines qualitative parameters and
steady development of the state. By the constitution, the state of Ka-
zakhstan is characterized as unitary and integral. The main characteristic
of the unitary state is that it has within it no other nations or independent
bodies. The unitary state assumes uniform citizenship, legislation, and a
system of state authority. "It is possible to ascertain that after a year, due
to the new Basic Law, the fundamental bases of a new statehood have
been achieved, including a uniform state authority capable of adjustment,
generated by direct public development."'
' 2
The efficacy of the three-part government of Kazakhstan is ex-
pressed in three aspects:
(1) No one government body or political organization can ignore or
stop the activity of constitutionally established institutions or uncontrol-
lably carry out imperious functions leading to the abolition of the consti-
9. See N.A. Nazarbaev, Message from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the
People ofKazakhstan, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, Oct. 8, 1996.
10. Source on file with author.
11. Source on file with author.
12. See NAZARBAEV, supra note 3, at 88-89.
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tutional system or usurpation of authority
by violence;
(2) The functional division of authorities assures the appropriate or-
ganization of legislative, executive, and judicial mechanisms. The legis-
lative authority is limited by referendum, by direct choices of the presi-
dent via his direct veto, and by a Constitutional Council. Its internal re-
striction is the two-chamber construction of Parliament. Executive
authority is limited by the responsibility before Parliament and the valid
character of the normative acts it issues. Judicial authority is subordinated
to the Constitution and law, and its internal division is embodied in the
Constitutional Court's allocation from the general judicial system, the
powers of the prosecutor's office, the courts, etc.
(3) The constitution provides legal and economic conditions of state
development on the basis of the self-management of various communi-
ties: regional, local, ethnic, cultural, social, industrial, religious, etc. In
the same vein the division of functions between the economic and politi-
cal system is carried out.
The Supreme Kenges of the country, carrying out legislative func-
tions, is the Parliament, which consists of two chambers: the Measles
(also Mails) and the Senate. The last several years have evidenced a psy-
chological crisis among Kazakhstan's citizens, wherein a nostalgia for the
old Soviet Union has given way to a national identification expressed in
the new statehood. The gradual affirmation of the notion of Kazakhstan
as a common house and common native land strengthens the spirit of pa-
triotism and the ideological consolidation of the whole society.
Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources, with proven oil reserves in
the Tengiz fields. These fields alone are about twice those of Alaska's
North Slope. Most world oil companies have acquired, or are acquiring,
concessions in Kazakhstan while negotiations are underway with various
foreign companies to build refineries and pipelines to bring the petroleum
to market. However, negotiations are now stalled by Kazakh insistence
that Russia should be included as a last-minute partner, at the expense of
the foreign partners' share. Oil alone is not the sole resource. The repub-
lic can boast of having the entire periodic table of elements in exportable
quantities. For example, development has begun of the Bakyrchik gold
fields, financed by shares sold on the London stock exchange. Although
these developments are being pursued by state owned companies, there is
considerable movement of capital into the private sector. Most of it ap-
pears to be illegal but sufficient to support the growth of subsidiary serv-
ice industries such as the Mercedes Benz dealership and service center in
Almaty.1 3
13. See Martha Brill Olcott, The New Nations of Central Asia, in THE SUCCESSOR STATES
TO THE USSR 213-14 (John W. Blaney ed., 1996).
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Just as in Russia and the other republics of the former USSR, the
processes of modernization and the transformations of Kazakhstan's
economy in six years of independence have passed along a difficult and
inconsistent path. The general factors which always distinguish the
economies of all the CIS states include, first and foremost, the inheritance
of a uniform economic complex, as well as a major disproportion be-
tween extractive and manufacturing industries, and between heavy and
light industries.
Despite the years of centralized economy and the difficulties attend-
ing the period of transition from totalitarian to democratic government,
Kazakhstan (at the point of achieving statehood) could claim a potentially
powerful industrial base. The Soviet Union's regional policy of economic
development worked to the detriment of all its constituent republics in
that it thwarted any economic self-sufficiency, guaranteeing a depend-
ence on the center. In Kazakhstan, this regional policy deployed a limited
arsenal of tools. The construction of enterprises in the regions at an ex-
pense often beyond the state budget's means was basic and fundamental.
Another tool was the state's subsidizing of local and republic budgets
from the state budget in order to finance social development. In Ka-
zakhstan, the size of the subsidy actually reached 30% to 40% of the
budget. The peculiarity of this mechanism of regional development was
that because basic investments for social development came from the
central budget, there was, consequently, no regional social planning en-
tity, and, moreover, no spatial organization of economic development at
the republic level.
In the sphere of industry, a possible optimum variant of development
was the creation of labor-intensive (yet non-capital-intensive) manufac-
turing entities which would effectively use the resources of local labor.
But in Kazakhstan the process of management by industrial and non-
productive activity went in the opposite direction and yielded a capital-
intensive variant. In Kazakhstan, the rates of cost increases for equip-
ment, labor, and investments were higher than in the European republics.
This cost increase was certainly due in part to the large imported labor
force, which left the ethnic Kazakh labor component at 35%. The tradi-
tionally agrarian pursuits of most Kazakhs were not taken into considera-
tion during the Soviet industrialization of the region. Consequently many
were not channeled into the new industrial work force. The irrational
structure of the republic's economy taxed its ability to viably pursue the
ever-increasing demands of the Soviet center on its extractive industries.
Even in the post-Soviet period a rapid rate of modernization was not pos-
sible. While the nation stabilizes itself, Kazakhstan's economy remains
essentially non-competitive in the world market.
The market reforms and strategic plans for socioeconomic develop-
ment in Kazakhstan are projected in three stages over a fifteen to twenty
1998]
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year period. During the first period a significant part of state properties
were privatized; the consumer markets were normalized; and the macroe-
conomy stabilized. The following seven to eight years is dedicated to di-
recting the new economy and developing an economic infrastructure sup-
porting an advanced market for goods, capital, and labor. In the third
stage, a period of five to seven years, the aim is to develop an open econ-
omy and to enter the ranks of the world's industrialized nations.
The strategy of the state economic policy in 1995 included the
achievement of macroeconomic stabilization, creation of conditions for
normalization of manufacturing and trade, revival of investment activi-
ties, and increases in solvent demand. Liberalization of the economy and
cutting of budget changes were accompanied by increased attention to the
needy within the population. There was a sharp decrease in inflation, and
the gain in real wages reached 9%.
Domestic legislation and international legal acts ratified by a state
are among the indisputable attributes of nationhood. Now we can ascer-
tain that the primary parts of the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan are the
conventional norms of international law ratified by Kazakhstan. They
include international treaties, conventions, and agreements which have a
priority above most national legislation. Thus the 1995 Constitution, be-
ing based on the continuity of legal principles declared in the 1993 Con-
stitution, proclaimed Kazakhstan a "democratic, unitarian, secular, legal,
and social state." 14 After the legitimization of its sovereignty by the peo-
ple and recognition by the world community, Kazakhstan will turn its
focus inward and work for harmonious social function. This means that
Kazakhstan is not a class-based or ettnocratic state, and that it provides
social programs and softens interethnic and social conflicts.' 5
Perhaps as a consequence, the emerging civic culture of the republic
is showing signs of being more encompassing and less restrictive than
those of Kazakhstan's neighbors. Unlike Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan has given Islam no special status in the republic, and has
controlled the activities of religious parties.16 On the other hand, unlike
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan provides constitutional status for Russian, mak-
ing a legal (though not entirely comprehensible) distinction between the
"state language" (Kazakh) and the "language of interethnic communica-
tion., 17 Political control in the republic is much more stringent than in
Kyrgyzstan, with strict constitutional penalties for "insults to presidential
14. Source on file with author.
15. See The Concept of a Language Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
KAZKAHSTANSKA A PRAVDA, Nov. 6, 1996.
16. See FBIS Daily Report: Central Asia (Foreign Broadcast Information Services, Feb.
13, 1993).
17. See KAZAKHSTATISKAY PRAVDA, Nov. 11, 1992.
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dignity" (which were invoked in one case that drew the attention of inter-
national human rights monitors). However, it is not the same in Uzbeki-
stan, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan.' 8
Nazarbaev by nature is a manager, and is content to permit diversity
of opinion and expression as long as it does not interfere with the state's
ability to fulfill its functions. Although Nazarbaev was elected with a So-
viet-style 98.9% of the vote, he shows no signs of developing a cult of
personality. His timetable for the republic's development implies that he
intends to honor the provisions of the new constitution, which will restrict
him (and his successors) to two five-year terms. Indeed, after initially
rejecting the creation of political parties, Nazarbaev seems to be moving
toward forming a party-like civic movement known as SNEK (Russian
acronym for the People's Union for Unity of Kazakhstan). SNEK would
further institutionalize the development strategy which Nazarbaev has
begun, while also providing a mechanism to discipline the abuses of po-
sition which have flourished. 19
Basic law, realizing the merger of public and state institutions, cre-
ates favorable opportunities for an active and teleological formation of a
civil society. Recognition of such ideological and political diversity also
allows for the creation of an independent mass media.
Considering the results and prospects of Kazakhstan's achievement
of statehood, one can note the following:
(1) As history has witnessed, each society needs a strengthening of
statehood in order to achieve stability and prosperity. Statehood itself
appears to be the driving force in the development of any people. The
present and future of any nation depend on its solidity and perfection;
(2) Kazakhstan, as a new sovereign state, must take into the ac-
count the experiences of other nations and of its own past as it grows to-
ward the 21st century. We should note that in "The Concept of Formation
of State Identity in Kazakhstan, 20 approved by the order of President
Nazarbaev on May 23, 1996, three models of statehood are promulgated
as inherent. The first model of Kazakhstan's former statehood should be
* considered as a positive experience and not just a past legacy, to be the
subject of historical and legal research. The next model of statehood
places Kazakhstan in the context of the Russian Empire and Soviet do-
minion. The final model is that of democratic legal statehood throughout
the world, to be emulated by Kazakhstan in its new purpose.
The development of Kazakhstan's statehood brings with it the neces-
sity for cultural and social growth in two major areas. The first relates to
the economic, social, and cultural integration with the rest of the world
18. See OLCoTr, supra note 6, at 220.
19- See Nezai, ISIMAY-A GAzETA, Feb. 9, 1993.
20. See KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, May 29, 1996.
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and the community of nations, as well as social integration within the
uniform national state.
Integration with the world implies recognition by a community of
Kazakhstan as a fully realized independent state. Integration within the
country, likewise, requires the citizenry's collective belief in their na-
tion's independent status. The confluence of these internal and external
dynamics are vital to Kazakhstan's own true achievement of independent
statehood.
Kazakhstan is the historically motivated initial ethnic center of the
Kazakh people. Hence, one may say that state identity must include the
preservation and development of the Kazakhs as the main ethnic unit with
their culture, way of life, language and traditions. The determination of
Kazkhstan as a national state must first recognize this quality in itself.
However, one must not forget that the national revival of the Kazakh
people, who for centuries populated the territory of modem Kazakhstan,
should not be of a nationalistic character.
When the Kazakh Steppe was populated solely by residents of the
so-called native nationality, such problems were not a concern. As the
territory of modem Kazakhstan became gradually populated by repre-
sentatives of other peoples, the essential early aspects of Kazakh state-
hood began to coalesce. Recent demographic accounts of Kazakhstan
indicate that the country is experiencing a slowdown in the overall rate of
population growth.2 This is due not only to the low birthrate of the Slavic
population, but also to the steady outflow of non-Kazakhs. Even by the
end of 1992, 7,000 ethnic Russians left Kazakhstan.' To counter this
trend, even non-governmental groups are actively trying to reverse the
flow. Political activist Kamal Ormantaev's new National Democratic
Party (NDP) has, as one of its goals, the inclusion of Russians and other
non-Kazakhs in the political affairs of Kazakhstan. Employing such uni-
fying themes as the problems with the environment, particularly the Aral
Sea, the NDP hopes that the current situation involving nationality-based
parties can be changed. It is ironic that the two states most interested in
maintaining liberal minority policies are also those experiencing prob-
lems of ethnic flight.
In the spring of 1994, the disaffection of Kazakhstan's Russians with
the increasing "Kazakhization" was exacerbated by the Russian govern-
ment's demands that ethnic Russian citizens of Kazakhstan be allowed to
hold citizenship in the Russian Federation. Allowing this type of citizen-
ship would violate the 1993 Kazakhstan Constitution's mandate against
21. See Roger D. Kancas, State Building, and Civil Society in Central Asia in POLITICAL
CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA AND THE NEw STATES OF EURASIA IN THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EURASIA 7 (Vladimer Tismaneau ed., 1996).
22. See Foreign Broadcast Information Services, Jan. 12, 1994 (manuscript at 38).
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dual citizenship. This provision, in fact, had been agreed upon only after
considerably difficult and long discussions among the document's fram-
ers. Thus Russia's incursion into this area of Kazakhstan's sovereignty
was keenly felt. Apparently encouraged by the Russian electoral suc-
cesses of Kazakhstan, such as native Vladimir Zhirinovsky and other ex-
treme nationalists just over the border, Kazakhstan's Russians increased
their demands for dual citizenship. These demands became even more
vocal following a tour of Central Asian capitals by Russian Foreign Min-
ister Andrei Kozyrev. Kozyrev sought to deflect right-wing criticism of
his pro-Western policies by displaying concern for the welfare of the
Russian populations in the "near abroad." A possible result of this rising
level of Russian nationalism might have been that the Russian Federation,
the neighbor with which Kazakhstan had the closest of ties, could easily
have become the greatest threat to Kazakhstan's national security.23
The situations of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were delicate, indeed.
The former had a small but important Russian population, which consti-
tuting a strong block of support for President Askar Akaev, while the lat-
ter's population was at least half Russian. Anxious to develop his repub-
lic's oil resources to best advantage, President Nazarbaev was eager to
make use of Omani, Iranian, and Saudi technical expertise, but reluctant
to acquire any Islamic "baggage" that might come with it.24
The Constitution of Kazakhstan holds that the Republic, as a nationa-
state, expresses the interests of its whole population independent of ethnic
origin. The ideology of universalism, therefore, instead of the principle of
internationalism, is of particular significance. The basic idea of univer-
salism is that all ethnic groups are given equal rights and possibilities for
development, i.e., none of them are subject to discrimination. Moreover,
the proposed ideology of universalism could be the national idea of the
Kazakh people as the spiritual leader of the national groups populating
Kazakhstan.
The main element for consolidation of the peoples of Kazakhstan,
consisting of the Kazakh nation and representatives of the other nation-
alities, is the Constitution. The Constitution declares equal rights to all
citizens of the Republic independent of their nationalities. All state bod-
ies, officials, and citizens should carry out their directives according to
this most important constitutional principle in order to achieve the
interethnic consent and unity of Kazakhstan's people. Kazakhstan cannot
simply follow the example of Western democracies, that would contradict
its own process of liberalization and economic modernization and weaken
23- See Bess A. Brown, National Security and Military Issues in Central Asia, in STATE
BUILDING AND MILITARY POWER IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA IN THE
INTERNATIONALPOLITIcs OFEURASIA. (Bruce Parrott, ed. 1996).
24. See MARTHA BRILLOLCOTr, NATION BUILDING IN CENTRALASIA 218 (1995).
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the role of the nation-state as the source of national identity. Incorpora-
tion of traditional Kazakh social institutions is vital in creating a state
which follows the lead of Western nations yet achieves a model of social
and economic development unique among the nations of today's world.
